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Abstract
Aviation maintenance technicians (AMTs) provide the technical and applied knowledge
required to maintain airworthiness in aircraft. In commercial aviation, maintenance tasks are
performed across multiple shifts. When AMTs share a maintenance task between shifts, the shift
turnover strategy used may determine if information is effectively transferred between AMTs.
Ineffective shift turnover strategies are a contributing factor in many aviation accidents and
incidents. Additionally, time constraints on certain maintenance tasks may cause AMTs to
commit error when performing a task. The present study examined the effect of shift turnover
strategy (face-to-face or written) and time pressure on error capture, accuracy, and completion
time of a maintenance task that was shared between two shifts. Forty AMT students completed
an unfinished maintenance task while subjected to conditions of shift turnover strategy and time
pressure. Three dependent variables, the number of skill-based errors, the number of trigger
event errors, and task completion time measured AMT performance. Results indicate that the
face-to-face shift turnover strategy was significantly more effective in preventing trigger event
errors than the written strategy. Additionally, AMTs under time pressure completed the task
significantly faster than AMTs not under time pressure. Therefore, the current study partially
supports the argument to require face-to-face shift turnover strategies in aviation maintenance.
Thus, the use of the face-to-face strategy may increase AMTs understanding of the task, as
suggested in the literature.
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Introduction
Aviation maintenance is one of many critical systems in air transportation. This system
relies on a number of assets to effectively maintain aircraft. Perhaps the most important asset to
this system is the Aviation Maintenance Technician (AMT). AMTs provide the technical and
applied knowledge required to maintain airworthiness in aircraft. However, their ability to do so
requires constant and effective communication with each other, especially between shifts. A
critical point in aviation maintenance where effective communication is required is during a shift
change. Consequently, the method of communication between different shifts is often influenced
by the organizational culture of the company.
Concurrently, increased demand for flight-ready aircraft is reducing the time an AMT is
allocated to complete repairs. In some situations, time constraints may cause the AMT to
commit error when performing a task. The accident case of Alaska Airlines Flight 261
exemplifies these situations.
On the afternoon of January 31, 2000, while in route to San Francisco International
Airport, Alaska Airlines Flight 261 crashed into the Pacific Ocean about three miles off the coast
of California. All persons onboard suffered fatal injuries. The primary cause of the accident was
a mechanical failure of the jackscrew trim system, which controlled pitch for the aircraft via a
horizontal stabilizer (see Figure 1). The retaining nut of the jackscrew sheared off in-flight,
causing the aircraft to pitch violently in a nose-down attitude, subsequently leading to loss of
aircraft control.
An investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found that an
extension of the scheduled maintenance interval of this particular jackscrew allowed Alaska
Airlines to continue to operate the aircraft well beyond the recommended maintenance interval.
Additionally, the NTSB recognized the organizational culture at Alaska Airlines as ―inadequate‖.
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More specifically, the use of ―pencil-whipping‖ was prevalent in many of the company‘s aircraft
inspections (National Transportation Safety Board, 2003). In fact, an Alaska Airlines aircraft
maintenance inspector found that the jackscrew was out of specifications and deemed the aircraft
unairworthy, until replacement of the jackscrew. He documented this statement on the aircraft
maintenance work order form and left for the day. The next shift supervisor did not agree with
the decision and because of time pressure to return the aircraft to service, crossed out the
previous inspector‘s instructions and signed-off the aircraft as airworthy. The failure of
communication between the two shifts involved is perhaps the most disturbing causal factor of
this accident.

Figure 1. The jackscrew is a 2-foot-long, 1-1/2-inch-diameter threaded shaft that moves up and
down, raising and lowering the leading edge of the stabilizer, the wing structure on the tail that
controls the plane's angle of flight.
The previous tragedy identifies two distinct problems in aviation maintenance operations,
―shift turnover communication‖ and ―time pressure‖. As seen in this particular accident, a lack
of face-to-face communication between work shifts may have resulted in the release of an
unairworthy aircraft. The problem of communication during shift turnovers lies within the
organizational practices of each aviation maintenance company. If Alaska Airlines had utilized
2

properly structured, face-to-face, shift turnover briefings, the outgoing inspector may have
verbally stressed the dire importance of replacing the jackscrew to the incoming shift, which may
have prevented this accident. Moreover, the rapid pace of commercial aviation induces time
pressures, as the industry itself relies upon constant availability of airworthy aircraft. With the
addition of time pressure, the incoming shift, in a rush to abide with schedule demands, made a
critical error by not discussing the reported issue with the outgoing shift before releasing the
aircraft.
The present study aimed to determine the effect of shift turnover strategy (face-to-face
communication or written communication) and time pressure on error capture, accuracy, and
completion time of a maintenance task that was shared between two shifts. The following
literature review presents discussion on shift turnover related accidents in high-risk
organizations, the aviation maintenance industry, shift turnover practices in the aviation
maintenance, and if shared mental model theory may improve cohesion between shift workers.
Shift turnover accident examples
Similar to aviation maintenance, many other high-risk industries rely upon 24-hour
operations. To accomplish tasks across multiple shifts, workers must communicate important
information regarding the tasks during a shift change. When proper communication does not
occur, dire consequences follow, as documented by the following cases.
The Sellafield Beach incident. In November 1983, workers at British Nuclear Fuels
Limited‘s Sellafield Works accidentally discharged highly radioactive liquid waste into the sea.
An investigation found that, due to a failure of communication between shifts, a tank, which was
assumed to contain a liquid suitable for discharge to the sea, in fact, contained highly radioactive
material that created an environmental hazard. This incident occurred during a plant shutdown
for routine annual maintenance. As workers transferred a written description of the tank contents
3

from one shift log to the next across several consecutive shifts, the written description of the tank
contents changed from ―ejections from HASW‖ to ―ex HASW washout.‖ As a result, what had
originally been interpreted as highly radioactive material was later interpreted as being low-level
runoff suitable for discharge into the sea. In this incident, the contents of the tank were
described in terms of their origin rather than their nature. Liquid waste, in this instance, is either
categorized as highly active, medium active, or low level runoff. Failure to accurately describe
the tank's contents, coupled with transcription errors made as written logbook contents were
copied from page to page, led to a misunderstanding (Miles, 1998).
The Piper Alpha disaster. In 1988, 167 workers were fatally injured when an offshore
oil platform in the North Sea exploded and subsequently burned. Failure of critical information
transfer was a significant cause to this disaster. Specifically, the outgoing shift did not notify the
incoming shift of the inoperative condition of a commonly used valve. Lack of this knowledge
led to the incoming shift turning the valve, which initiated the disaster (Parke and Kanki, 2008).
Investigators concluded that no written procedures for shift handover existed. Additionally,
there was no pre-determined analysis or categorization of important items to include in the
handover (Miles, 1998).
Continental Express flight 2547. In 1991, Continental Express Flight 2574 crashed in a
cornfield in Texas, killing all 14 onboard. The NTSB determined that an outgoing maintenance
shift failed to communicate to an incoming shift the importance of replacing the missing
fasteners for the de-ice boot on the horizontal stabilizer. Subsequently, the upper leading edge of
the aircrafts horizontal stabilizer ripped off during flight, causing the pilots to lose control
(National Transportation Safety Board,1992).
The previous accidents exemplify the consequences of improper communication between
shifts. To understand why errors in shift turnover communication in an aviation maintenance
4

environment are prevalent, it is vital to understand the individuals involved, how they are trained
and, the aviation maintenance industry.
The aviation maintenance system
The aviation maintenance system is complex and requires the collective effort of many
professionals to transport thousands of people everyday safely. The AMT is the key player in
this system.
Aviation maintenance technicians. Aviation Maintenance Technicians perform the
necessary repairs and inspections to maintain airworthiness on all certificated aircraft. Title 14,
Part 65 of the Code of Federal Regulations outlines AMT activities. Specifically, Part 65.81
provides a brief explanation of aircraft mechanics' rights and responsibilities. It states that, "A
certificated mechanic may perform or supervise the maintenance, preventive maintenance or
alteration of an aircraft or appliance, or a part thereof, for which he is rated (but excluding major
repairs to, and major alterations of, propellers, and any repair to, or alteration of, instruments),
and may perform additional duties in accordance with sub-sections 65.85, 65.87, and 65.95‖
(Federal Aviation Administration, 2010a). The latter sub-sections briefly describe the
requirements for an AMT to perform 100-hour inspections on an airframe or powerplant.
Though these governing rights and responsibilities ensure that only certain people may perform
the duties of an AMT, they only provide general guidelines and do not fully explain the rigorous
detail that AMTs apply to ensure airworthiness.
Professionalism in aviation maintenance. Unlike other maintenance professions (e.g.,
automobile mechanic), AMTs are trained to be meticulous in every aspect. Using the automobile
mechanic as a comparison, differences in professionalism become evident. First, an AMTs work
will affect thousands of people in future flights. This means that every task they perform must
be done so with the highest level of accuracy. AMTs maintain this high-level of accuracy by
5

following written procedures, as well as having their work double-checked by an inspector.
Conversely, automobile mechanics are not required to follow written procedures, nor have their
work inspected by a second person. An automobile mechanic's work may only affect a few
people, and in most cases, a malfunctioning vehicle can simply pull over. Second, AMTs must
possess a greater level of professionalism than automobile mechanics, combining such
characteristics as competence, control and commitment to safety (Taylor & Thomas, 2003). A
simple comparison of a car mechanic's toolbox and an AMT's toolbox demonstrates the level of
commitment to safety. The automobile Mechanics toolbox is unorganized, with tools strung
about, whereas an AMT's tools lie neatly placed in order. Commonly referred to as a "shadowed
box", each drawer of an AMTs toolbox has shaped holes that fit the exact tool that lies there.
This ensures that no tools are accidently left onboard an aircraft. The AMT simply checks his
toolbox for missing tools, before the aircraft is released for flight. Thirdly, for an AMT to
perform maintenance on a certificated aircraft, he must possess a certificate issued by the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), whereas car mechanics require no certification to work on
automobiles.

1

Training for aviation maintenance. Aviation maintenance is a highly specialized field
of work, which requires numerous hours of schooling compared to other maintenance programs.
An AMT must accrue approximately 1900 contact hours of training to be eligible for testing,
whereas an auto mechanic must only posses two years of unstructured hands-on experience to be
eligible for ASE testing (Federal Aviation Administration, 2010c; National Institute for
Automotive Service Excellence, 2009). Aviation maintenance schools must retain certification
from the FAA and must teach a specific list of topics. These topics are split into three categories
or ratings: Powerplant, Airframe, and General. Both the Powerplant and the Airframe categories
1

Thankfully, most reputable auto. mechanics possess certification from institutions such as the
National Institute for Automotive Service Excellence (NIASE, 2009).
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cover the technical knowledge required to service these aviation systems. The General category,
on the other hand, consists of basic math and English proficiency, common repair procedures,
regulations and requirements, and most importantly, written documentation. The written
documentation portion of the General rating ensures AMTs are able to read procedural items
such as maintenance manuals, airworthiness directives, work cards, as well as, effectively
document repairs or alterations performed on an aircraft in a record or database (Federal
Aviation Administration, 2009). The General rating does not include any training on
interpersonal communication (Taylor & Christensen, 1998). Other communication training may
occur, but only at the discretion of individual AMT instructors.
Written documentation/”work cards”. Written documentation plays a significant role
in the successful operation of aviation maintenance. AMTs rely on written documents to provide
instructions on maintenance tasks as well as to ensure compliance with regulations. There are
numerous types of documents used in aviation maintenance. The FAA provides regulatory
documents, such as FARs and airworthiness directives, while aircraft manufacturers provide
maintenance manuals, work cards, and service bulletins. AMTs use work cards to show the
progress of a task. The use of work cards attempts to eliminate any chance for error by
providing step-by-step instructions for maintenance tasks. By checking-off each step of a task,
an AMT can document his progression through a task.
Aviation maintenance industry. Aviation maintenance operates on a time-based
schedule to keep airworthy aircraft available for thousands of daily flights. A delay in flight
schedules can cost thousands of dollars and possibly the choice of customers to purchase future
flights with that airline. This constant need to keep aircraft in a ready-to-fly state translates
down to a necessity for an effective organizational structure and, ultimately, to effective job
performance of AMTs.
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Aviation maintenance is performed in many different environments, but the most familiar
(in commercial aviation) include Line Maintenance Operations (LMOs) and hanger maintenance.
AMTs that work in LMOs are often in view of the flying public and are part of the ramp crew
(i.e., the crew that services the aircraft at the gate). These AMTs work to solve issues (i.e., light
maintenance) during the time the aircraft is cycling between passengers. LMO mechanics are
some of the most experienced technicians and therefore must be able to diagnose and repair
problems rapidly. It is rare that a maintenance task is not completed before a shift change occurs
in LMOs, as their tasks usually take less than one hour to complete. However, LMO mechanics
have their share of time constraints, as the aircraft they service are typically in between flights.
A maintenance task deemed beyond the capabilities of the LMO mechanics is moved to a
maintenance hangar.
The majority of aircraft maintenance in commercial aviation is performed in maintenance
hangars, which are usually located just off the tarmac. Maintenance performed in a hanger
environment is deemed medium to heavy maintenance. Medium maintenance tasks vary in time
depending on the problem item. For example, tire changes require a few hours, while, multipoint
inspections require several hours. Heavy maintenance tasks range in complexity and require
several hours or in some cases up to several days to complete. The AMT‘s that work in medium
to heavy maintenance are subjected to time pressures, as each maintenance task is allotted a
certain time frame and must be completed in order to meet schedule demands. Although aircraft
maintenance is carried out in many environments, this paper will focus on hanger maintenance,
as many maintenance tasks in this environment are performed across multiple shifts.
Shift work in aviation maintenance
Most medium to heavy maintenance is a 24-hour operation and therefore occurs over
multiple shifts. The likelihood that more than one shift will work on a single aircraft is high; at
8

times as many as 12 to 15 shifts work on a single aircraft (Parke & Kanki, 2008). Multiple shifts
imply that each shift is comprised of different AMTs. Some tasks require multiple people to
complete a task, while other tasks only require a single person. If, for instance, a group of AMTs
is performing a multipoint inspection on an aircraft and their shift ends, another group of AMTs
takes over the inspections. Regardless of how many AMTs there are on a team, it is generally
the sole responsibility of the AMT working on a particular aircraft or component to brief the next
shift of the critical information necessary to maintain a smooth transition. This exchange of
information is often informal, speedy, and requires not only interpersonal trust, but also the
ability to communicate information concisely and completely.
According to the FAA, shift turnovers are one of the critical phases of aviation
maintenance and must be performed correctly (Federal Aviation Administration, 2005).
Unfortunately, current Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) do not directly address specific
shift turnover practices in aviation maintenance and therefore the procedure in which they occur
varries across maintnenance orginizations (Maddox, 1998). In fact, FAR Part 121.369 only
requires an organization's maintenance manual to contain, "Procedures to ensure that required
inspections, other maintenance, preventative maintenance, and alterations that are not completed
as a result of shift changes or similar work interruptions are properly completed before the
aircraft is released to service" (Federal Aviation Administration, 2010b). Essentially, this
regulation only requires aviation maintenance organizations to complete any maintenance task
they begin, yet does not require, or outline a structured shift turnover briefing. An ideal aviation
maintenance shift change includes (a) time for the outgoing person to prepare, (b) a shift
handover, where outgoing and incoming persons exchange information that is relevant to the task
that must be finished, and (c) "cross-checking" the outgoing persons' briefing, while enabling the
incoming person to ask questions about the task (Miles, 1998).
9

Shift turnovers in aviation maintenance generally occur in two ways. There are written
shift turnovers, where the shift-lead acts as a liaison between shifts, passing information from the
previous shift to the incoming shift and there are face-to-face shift turnovers, where the outgoing
shift communicates directly with the incoming shift. These two types of information exchanges
are also referred to as synchronous and asynchronous, respectively (Drury & Ma, 2003).
Written shift turnover. In a written shift turnover, little or no face-to-face
communication occurs between the outgoing and incoming shifts. Instead, a step-by-step
progression of the task is documented in writing on a work card. If an AMT‘s shift ends before
he can complete a task, the general practice is to sign his name next to the last step he completed
on the work card. The AMT then hands over the written documentation to the shift lead and
leaves for the day. The shift lead then passes the written documentation from the outgoing AMT
to the incoming AMT. The incoming AMT then proceeds from the last step signed-off by the
outgoing AMT to complete the task. Though this may seem like a sound method of information
transfer, there may be errors with the outgoing AMTs work. Therefore, the incoming AMT must
decide between two methods of completing the work: either trust the outgoing AMT‘s work and
quickly finish all remaining tasks, or spend additional time checking over the outgoing AMT‘s
work before continuing with the task. A check over the outgoing AMT‘s work likely results in
an increase in task completion time, thereby increasing the effect of time pressure, which may
cause the AMT to make errors. It is important to note that if the task is not completed in the
allotted amount of time, the aircraft will not be released until the task is complete. However, as
time pressure increases, the AMT may speed through the task to make the deadline, possibly
making critical errors, such as installing incorrect hardware.
Face-to-face shift turnover. In a face-to-face shift turnover, the outgoing AMT
discusses the task directly with the incoming AMT. By stopping his work early, the outgoing
10

AMT is able to gather all pertinent information related to the task for the incoming AMT. This
information includes what items have been completed in the task, what items remain, any
changes that have occurred to the procedure (i.e., airworthiness directives), as well as any
concerns about the task. A shift turnover briefing then occurs, where the outgoing and incoming
AMTs can directly discuss the task. Having an opportunity to ask the outgoing AMT questions
about the task, as well as crosscheck the outgoing AMTs work, the incoming AMT may have a
higher probability in safely completing the task in the allotted amount of time.
Research on shift turnovers in aviation maintenance. Currently, the use of written
shift turnover reports is the predominant method of shift change in aviation maintenance,
especially across multiple shifts (Parke & Kanki, 2008). The prevalence of written shift
turnovers in aviation maintenance organizations is likely because no FAA standardized shift
turnover process exists. Unfortunately, the indirect strategy may be ineffective. According to
Parke and Kanki (2008), vague and brief shift turnovers are a leading cause to the dispatch of
unairworthy aircraft. Parke and Kanki (2008) analyzed 46 Aviation Safety Reporting System
(ASRS)2 reports that pertain to shift turnover communication issues. They found that, when
compared to non-turnover-communication-related reports, errors in part installation occurred
much more frequently (50% vs. 27%) and of these installation instances, 96% carried a label of
critical equipment installation versus 74% in non-turnover-communication-related incidents
reports. Additionally, they found that incidents that were deemed ―serious‖ such as, in-flight
shut down and injury, occurred twice as often in reports involving shift turnover, than those that
did not. They found that the highest contributing factor in errors during a shift turnover were
workcards, accounting for nearly half (46%). This suggested the critical role that workcards play
during a turnover and that increasing the completeness and accuracy of workcards would result
2

ASRS reports are submitted on a voluntary basis and therefore do not fully represent the total
amount of incidents that occur.
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in a reduction of issues in shift turnover communication (Parke & Kanki, 2008). Interestingly
though, briefings were reported as a much lower contributing factor to errors (15%). The
researchers suggested that fewer errors may occur when verbal briefings are used during shift
turnovers, but also may indicate that verbal briefings seldom occur (Parke & Kanki, 2008). All
maintenance organizations utilize some form of written communication to document what
maintenance activities occur.
For example, discrepancies may exist in the written documentation and an alteration to
the procedure of one of the tasks is necessary. When a shift change occurs, the outgoing AMT
may not provide a written explanation for the alteration of the procedure. Without face-to-face
communication between the incoming and outgoing AMT, the misinterpretation of the alteration
can led to the incoming AMT making errors. The incoming AMT may not share the same
understanding or mental model of the maintenance task, aircraft configuration, or work cards.
Additionally, the incoming AMT may have been away from work for an extended period and
may not be aware of procedural changes, in which interpreting any written communication even
more challenging. Experience levels may also differ across shifts and an AMT may make
assumptions about their knowledge that may not be true of other technicians (International Civil
Aviation Organization, 2003) which, again, interpretation of written remarks may prove difficult.
Unsafe acts. A lack of shift turnover communication in aviation maintenance may
increase the likelihood of unsafe acts. Hobbs and Williamson (2002) developed a 48-item
survey that asked AMTs a series of questions regarding the occurrence of unsafe acts in the
aviation maintenance domain. The survey items contained specific language and technical detail
appropriate to unsafe acts that occur in aviation maintenance. A total of 1,359 of 4,600 AMTs,
licensed by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, completed and returned the survey. AMTs rated
each item using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = ‗Never‘, 5 = ‗Very often‘). The highest reported
12

unsafe acts include, ―Not referred to the maintenance manual or other approved documentation
on a familiar job (M = 3.18)‖ and ―Been misled by confusing documentation (M = 2.84)‖. The
latter occurs when the AMT is confused by a previous shift's written communication. This may
indicate that often there are no face-to-face briefings between shifts and because the opportunity
to ask questions did not exist, an unsafe act occurred (Hobbs and Williamson, 2002).
AMTs' opinions on shift turnover briefings. Organizations that have developed their
own standardized shift turnover process show increased levels of trust and professionalism
amongst their AMTs. Taylor and Thomas (2003) surveyed 3,150 AMTs across five aviation
maintenance companies using the Maintenance Resource Management Technical Operations
Questionnaire. The survey was comprised of 34 items that measure attitudes and opinions
related to aviation maintenance functions. Participants were asked to express their agreement or
disagreement to a series of statements. Results indicated a high level of trust and
professionalism amongst team members. Particularly, when asked their opinions of the
statements ―Debriefing after major task is important‖ and ―Start of shift meetings are important‖,
AMTs responded with agreement, across all but one company (Taylor and Thomas, 2003).
Group discussions. Group discussions can also improve shift turnover communication
by allowing members to capture problems and discuss intent, rather than reading written
documentation of what occurred in previous shifts. Parke and Mishkin (2005) demonstrated this
notion by observing the evolution of shift turnovers in an interplanetary robotic control program.
By analyzing errors made by a previous robotic rover control program, they gained insight on
how to improve the next mission. The program implemented ―best practices,‖ including a shift
turnover meeting, in which operators discussed past issues as well as future pathing or direction
of travel of the robot. All operators from both outgoing and incoming shifts, as well as
managers, attended the shift turnover meetings. The program involved three shifts that
13

controlled a robotic rover on Mars. The accuracy and attention to detail required to maneuver a
robot on Mars necessitates a need for effective shift turnover communication. Any errors can
have dire future consequences, due to the delay of time from controller input to robot maneuver.
An improvement in reduction of errors, as well as an increase in efficiency in robot operation
was attained by implementing the shift turnover meetings. Additionally, Parke and Mishkin
(2005) developed and proposed a generalized checklist that outlines the typical communicative
items that occur during a shift change, which was derived from shift turnover literature.
Coordination. Coordination during a shift turnover may decrease the likelihood of
errors. Suzuki, von Thaden, and Geibel (2008) analyzed 680 ASRS reports, ranging from
August 2004 to July 2006, pertaining to FAR Part 121 scheduled airline operations to identify
contributing factors in aviation maintenance related incidents. A combination of a qualitative
analysis and categories from the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (Wiegmann
& Shappell, 2003) were applied to the narrative reports. Subject matter experts classified
communication and coordination issues, and then divided the reports into nine categories. Errors
related to ―lack of vigilance‖ occurred the most times (n = 421), while ―coordination‖ errors
occurred in 17% (n = 115) of the reports. Not surprisingly, errors related to ―time pressure‖ had
the third highest occurrence (n = 146). AMT‘s reported not paying attention when they missed a
task or not being aware of the task entirely. It was also suggested that because AMTs also
reported a high level of multi-tasking, their attention level was reduced in order to cope with
multiple tasks under time pressure. Most significantly, time pressures showed a positive
association with decision-making errors, whereas routine violations showed a negative
relationship to time pressures. Though shift turnover communication errors were not directly
investigated, the results of this study cite coordination and communication in aviation
maintenance operations as critical in preventing errors. A proper shift turnover may increase
14

coordination and communication in aviation maintenance teams (Suzuki, von Thaden, and
Geibel, 2008).
Maintenance Resource Management
Literature on Maintenance Resource Management (MRM) provides further precedence
for the need of improved communication in shift turnovers. The FAA describes MRM as a
"process for improving communication, effectiveness, and safety in aircraft maintenance
operations" (FAA, 2000, p. 6) which addresses "teamwork deficiencies within the aviation
maintenance environment" (p. 6). As mentioned previously, written communication is dominant
in the aviation maintenance environment. This notion is generally true for all the players
involved, including management, inspectors, parts clerks, tool clerks, and even FAA inspectors.
The only exception is if the organization has received training that specifically deals with
interpersonal and intrapersonal communication, such as the more popular MRM programs that
are spreading throughout the industry. MRM programs have shown success in improving
communication amongst aviation maintenance personnel.
Development of MRM. Derived from the more popular Crew Resource Management
(CRM), MRM aims to reduce errors in the aviation maintenance environment through the
understanding of human factors. The first reported CRM program geared towards AMTs began
in late 1989. The need for MRM became apparent after the Aloha Airlines accident on April 28,
1988, where the overall focus of blame shifted from the individual to the entire operational
system. Additionally, it revealed issues such as human performance limitations, teamwork,
communication, organizational culture, and training (Patankar & Taylor, 2008). Currently in its
fourth generation, MRM has demonstrated a pattern of changing interest in the focus of
organizational variables and longitudinal stability of post-training attitude and behavior changes
(Taylor & Patankar, 2001).
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First Generation MRM. As described by Taylor and Patankar (2001), the first
generation of MRM training primarily focused on communication skills and awareness between
AMTs. Successful training was measured through individual attitude changes, rates of injuries
and aircraft ground damage. However, lack of continued organizational support hindered
ongoing success of first generation MRM training. Taylor and Patankar report that many first
generation programs were either discontinued or forgotten following management or strategic
changes.
Second Generation MRM. Second generation programs primarily focused on direct
communication (i.e., focus groups with AMTs) rather than impersonal classroom training. The
program was successful in reducing paperwork and logbook errors. However, Taylor and
Patankar note that second generation programs had the tendency to highlight prior issues rather
than proactively teaching the avoidance of key factors before they become issues.
Third Generation MRM. Third generation MRM programs focused on situational
awareness and coping mechanisms, individual issues that affect safety, and encouraged
organizational change, while directly targeting management and FAA inspectors (Taylor and
Patankar, 2001). These programs also helped to identify twelve major causes of maintenance
errors, commonly named the "Dirty Dozen" (see Table 1); as of 2001, this list is included in all
reported MRM programs implemented in North America since 1994 (Taylor and Patankar, 2001;
FAA, 2005).

16

Table 1
The "Dirty Dozen"
1. Lack of Communication

7. Lack of Resources

2. Complacency

8. Pressure

3. Lack of Knowledge

9. Lack of Assertiveness

4. Distraction

10. Stress

5. Lack of Teamwork

11. Lack of Awareness

6. Fatigue

12. ―Destructive‖ Workplace Norms

Research on third generation training revealed a new concern. Taylor & Christensen
(1998) found that initial post-training reports showed AMTs showed enthusiasm and positive
feelings towards MRM training. However, after several months, Taylor reports that AMTs
showed frustration and anger with MRM training. When asked why, the AMTs reported a lack
of managerial and organizational support for implementing training information and an
uncertainty if the training had been successful for the organization. Taylor concluded that the
MRM training implemented at this specific company did not match the organizations leadership
practices or environmental factors of the facility. These findings encouraged MRM to evolve,
once again, ensuring that the context of training fit the organizational and environmental factors.
Fourth Generation MRM. The fourth (current) generation of MRM training programs
has attempted to correct the weaknesses of previous generations by incorporating systems theory,
actively identifying errors before they occur, while focusing on the individual behavior approach
of the third generation to promote a structured communications process (Taylor and Patankar,
2001). The current generation is interested in measuring AMT attitudes not only on safety-
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related issues (such as whether AMTs feel their work impacts passenger safety), but also on
organizational context issues such as leadership and environmental factors.
To further stress the importance of MRM training, the FAA issued an Advisory Circular
(AC120-72) that provides guidelines in developing MRM programs (FAA, 2000). Advisory
Circulars are documents sent to all aviation organizations and are regarded as important
recommendations from the FAA. Essentially, this document provides the information and
guidelines for an organization to design and implement an MRM training program. The
introduction and growth of MRM programs have made a positive contribution to improving
safety in aviation maintenance. Although MRM programs are currently ―recommended‖, they
may become a requirement in the future. Additionally, the issue of shift turnover communication
is also growing equally in popularity and priority.
Recent initiatives in improving shift turnover communication
In 1998, the FAA published ―The Operator‘s Manual for Human Factors in Aviation
Maintenance‖ with the intention of providing maintenance organizations guidelines for
implementing human factors training. Chapter 4 of this manual outlines eight challenges related
to shift turnovers as the following:
(1) high demand for teamwork and interpersonal communication skills, (2) need
for structured and standardized policies and procedures, (3) need for a location
that is conducive for discussion and planning, (4) ineffective verbal and written
communication, (5) finishing workers are tired and want to depart facility, (6)
lack of adequate shift overlap to provide time for one-on-one briefings between
the team leaving and the team coming on, (7) absence of a process to ensure
departing personnel have documented all tasks accomplished or started, (8)
minimal training on procedures for shift/task turnover (FAA, 2005).
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Similar challenges with shift turnovers in aviation maintenance are discussed in chapter 7
of the ―Guidance Material on the UK CAA Interpretation of Part-145 Human Factors and Error
Management Requirements‖ (Civil Aviation Authority, 2003). This document cites three basic
elements that must occur for a successful shift turnover: "1) the outgoing person‘s ability to
understand and communicate the important elements of the job or task being passed over to the
incoming person. 2) the incoming person‘s ability to understand and assimilate the information
being provided by the outgoing person. 3) a formalized process for exchanging information
between outgoing and incoming persons and a place and time for such exchanges to take place".
The NTSB issued a similar document (A-04-15, 16) that recommends implementing human
factors training in aviation maintenance (NTSB, 2006). All of these documents cite shift
turnover communication as one of many problem areas that require immediate attention.
The suggestions made by the regulatory bodies cumulate the necessity for a shared
understanding or a ―shared mental model‖ between two shift workers. Essentially, the steps they
suggest for successful information exchange mirrors how researchers describe shared mental
model theory (Mathieu, Rapp, Maynard, & Mangos, 2010).
Shared Mental Model Theory
A mental model is comprised of organized knowledge structures that enable individuals
to interact with their environment (Mathieu et al., 2010). People use mental models to predict
and explain environmental changes, to identify and recall the way certain parts of the
environment are grouped together, and to construct expectations for future events (Mathieu,
Heffner, Goodwin, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 2000). For instance, when an AMT encounters an
aircraft part he has inspected many times in the past, he draws from the knowledge and
experience of that part. The theory of "shared mental models" extends the mental model concept
to the team. That is, a shared mental model refers to 2 or more teammates having a mutual
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understanding of the task, their respective roles and responsibilities, procedures, and timing
(Blickensderfer, Reynolds, Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2010). This mutual understanding allows
teammates to work efficiently together, without high levels of communication (Blickensderfer, et
al., 2010).
According to Stout, Cannon-Bowers, and Salas (1996), preexisting shared mental models
will not be important in situations where team members are allowed to freely communicate with
each other when sharing a task, for example, AMTs working together on the same shift. In this
situation, the team has the ability to discuss the next moves, without relying on preexisting
knowledge to complete a task. On the other hand, in situations where communication is limited,
such as one technician on one shift and his teammate on the next shift, shared mental models are
crucial to team functioning, as they allow the members to predict the information and resource
requirements of their teammates (Mathieu et al., 2000).
Consider an aviation maintenance task, where a shift change occurs mid-task. In the
course of working on the part, ―Technician 1‖ has acquired information particular to that repair.
He now has an understanding of the particular situation, the implications of the job, and any
details specific to that case/job. Thus, he now has a full, detailed mental model of the job. It is
essential for this understanding to be passed to the next worker (―Technician 2‖), and that
Technician 1 and Technician 2 have a shared mental model of what needs to be done and details
specific to the job. Exchanging written documentation alone may not provide all information
needed for workers on different shifts to acquire a shared mental model of the task. If the
inspection of the part is performed across two work shifts, both AMTs may need to
communicate, face-to-face, in order to attain a shared mental model.
Implications of face-to-face communication in shift turnovers. A number of
arguments exist that support a positive outcome with the inclusion of face-to-face
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communication in shift turnovers. Face-to-face communication occurs when two or more people
communicate verbally about a subject. The value of this form of communication lies within the
additional knowledge attained by either party. Open discussions allow each person to fully grasp
the idea being discussed. Conversely, written communication may leave gaps, as the reader
leaves what is written to interpretation. The reader may contact the writer to ask questions, but
in cases of shift changes, the writer may not be available for clarification.
Parke and Kanki (2008) suggest that adding face-to-face communication in shift
turnovers helps teams to achieve a shared mental model by conveying gestures, eye contact,
tones of voice, degrees of confidence, and other rich aspects of personal communication (Knapp,
1995). More importantly, all aspects of the task can be discussed in detail. Direct face-to-face
communication adds redundancy to written documentation used during a shift turnover by
enabling the incoming AMT to ask questions, while allowing the outgoing AMT to provide
feedback (Parke & Kanki, 2008). Researchers agree that written communication alone is not as
powerful in effective information transfer as a combination of written and face-to-face
communication during a shift turnover (Coiera & Tombs, 1998; Suzuki, von Thaden, & Geibel,
2008; Majoros, 2008; Parke & Kanki, 2008).
Another issue in shared mental model generation is with differing experience levels
between shifts. In this sense, the task is familiar to the outgoing technician, but not the incoming
technician. When a person reads information, for instance a workcard, they may interpret and
process that information differently than someone else. Their understanding of the task, certain
terminology, tools, and procedures is pulled from their long-term memory store and is combined
with immediate environmental stimuli to formulate a mental model of the task (International
Civil Aviation Organization, 2003; Federal Aviation Administration, 2005). When two shift
technicians discuss the task face-to-face, the inexperienced technician can learn from the
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experienced technician, where, if the inexperienced technician just read the workcard, he may
not understand the task completely.
Face-to-face communication may better allow both shifts to share ideas, recall past
experiences, and make accurate predictions of what may occur when performing the task. Body
gestures, facial expressions, and tone of voice help to focus attention to details (Parke &
Mishkin, 2005). For example, the inspectors involved in the Alaska Airlines accident did not
communicate face-to-face. Though the outgoing inspector requested in writing that the
jackscrew be replaced, the incoming inspector disregarded the written instructions and released
the aircraft. If these two inspectors had participated in a face-to-face shift turnover, the incoming
inspector may have made a different decision because of his perception of the danger involved in
not replacing the jackscrew, as shown by the facial expressions and tone of voice of the outgoing
inspector. Even with the addition of face-to-face communication and improved shared mental
models to shift turnovers, the AMT is still subjected to time pressure when completing the task
left by the previous shift, and time pressure may have additional implications for task
performance.
Time pressure. In an effort to reduce costs and maximize profits, commercial aviation
companies are streamlining their operational processes. To remain competitive, companies are
decreasing turnaround time for aircraft repairs. This decrease in turnaround time leads to an
increase of time pressure placed on the technicians performing the repairs. When time pressures
increase, the chance of committing errors may also increase. Even with the appropriate
documentation (e.g., maintenance manuals, work cards), AMT‘s continue to make mistakes on
repairs when subjected to time pressure. Suzuki, Von Thaden, & Geibel (2008) found that time
pressure (n = 145, 27.5%) was the second major contributing factor found in 680 ASRS incident
reports related to maintenance error. The most significant contributing factor was lack of
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vigilance (n = 418, 79.3%). AMT‘s reported not paying attention when they missed a task or not
being aware of the task entirely. It was also suggested that because AMTs also reported a high
level of multi-tasking, their attention level was reduced in order to cope with multiple tasks
under time pressure. Most significantly, time pressures showed a positive association with
decision-making errors, whereas routine violations showed a negative relationship to time
pressures. However, it can be speculated that an AMT who has an elevated understanding of the
task may be more resistant to time pressure, where if he did not interact with the previous shift,
the pressure of completing the task on time may cause slips and unsafe acts.
AMTs must retain and use a certain amount of domain specific rules to effectively make
repairs (acquired in training). These rules vary from knowledge of tool usage to specific rivet
patterns on a wing repair. AMTs then use these specific rules, combined with the written
procedures to repair aircraft. However, when AMTs are subjected to time pressures, these rules
become ever more important, as they must be able to recall and implement the rules without
hesitation. In a study on emergency decision making while under time pressure, Lin and Su
(1998) found that time pressure had a destructive effect on the performance of rule-based
reasoning. Additionally, people under time pressure suffered a significant decrease in accuracy
when implementing the domain rules compared to those who were not subjected to time pressure
(Lin and Su, 1998).
The way people cope with time pressure varies dependent on the situation and task
knowledge. Chu and Spires (2001) suggest that people cope with time pressure using three
strategies. The first coping mechanism, a process termed acceleration, occurs when people may
try to process the same amount of information, but at a faster rate. The second coping
mechanism, termed filtration, occurs when people process only a subset of available information,
usually the most important information. The third coping mechanism, termed process changes,
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occurs when people change or modify their decision processes. These process changes vary
from a moderate change (switching from a compensatory process to a non-compensatory
process) to an extreme change (avoidance or escaping from the task). Additionally, filtration and
acceleration may be combined in some situations, where the person focuses on a portion of the
total available information and processes it faster (Chu & Spires, 2001).
The way people make decisions while performing complex tasks may be dependent on
the level of time pressure induced and their experience with the task. In a study of decision
making in dynamic environments, Gonzalez (2004) found that performance during a complex
task degraded in people under severe time pressure than those who had more time for reflective
decision making in the same complex task. Those people under severe time pressure had three
times more practice sessions than those in the less stringent time pressure group. Gonzalez
suggested that performing a task several times, under severe time pressure, results in poorer
overall performance in future incidents of the same task. Where, performing a task, under low
time pressure, results in better performance when the task is encountered in the future (Gonzalez,
2004).
Summary of literature review
Incorrect information transfer between shift workers is a causal factor in accidents and
incidents in complex systems. The complexity of the aviation maintenance system requires its
technicians to have a high-level of professionalism and training. Concurrently, technicians are
placed under time pressures to keep pace with a constant demand system. A critical element in
aviation maintenance is information exchange, and this is particularly tricky during shift
changes. Inadequate communication between shifts has led to costly errors in aviation
maintenance as well as other high-risk industries. Problems identified in the literature point to
documentation comprehension, misunderstandings of a previous shifts work, and loss of
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attention. Currently, technicians primarily use written documents when transferring information
between shifts. Written documents alone, however, may not provide other unique rich qualities
one would receive in a face-to-face conversation. The evolution of MRM has helped in
recognizing the issue of improper shift turnovers. Its contribution has provided insight on the
capabilities of AMTs, as well as identified the major issues in aviation maintenance
communication. The success of MRM programs paved the way for more detailed research in
specific issue areas, such as shift turnover communication.
The addition of face-to-face to written information provides redundancy to shift
turnovers, by allowing both shifts to actively interact and possibly develop a shared mental
model of the task being handed over. A face-to-face shift change may help AMTs to ensure
critical information is understood and successfully transferred to the next shift.
Statement of Problem
Based upon the above literature review, written shift turnover practices may not be
suitable for complete transfer of information between shifts. Therefore, the present study aimed
to determine the effect of shift turnover strategy (face-to-face or written) and time pressure on
error capture, accuracy, and completion time of a maintenance task that was shared between two
shifts.
Statement of hypotheses
This research attempted to distinguish which type of shift turnover is best suited for
aviation maintenance in time-sensitive situations. It was expected that the turnover strategy
would affect AMT performance, specifically;
H1a: AMTs subjected to a written shift turnover would make more errors on a
maintenance task than AMTs who received a face-to-face briefing.
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H1b: AMTs who received a written shift turnover would take longer to perform a
maintenance task than AMTs who receive a face-to-face shift briefing.
Additionally, it is was expected that time pressure would influence maintenance task
performance, specifically;
H2: AMTs who were subjected to time pressure would make more errors than AMTs
who were given ample time to complete a maintenance task.
Finally, it was expected that the type of shift turnover would moderate the effect of time pressure
on performance, such that;
H3: AMTs who received a face-to-face shift turnover would be less impacted by time
pressure than AMTs who received a written shift turnover.
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Method
Participants
A sample of 40 students (M = 25.2 years) enrolled in the Aviation Maintenance Science
program at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University participated in the study. This sample was
selected due to the specialties and criticalities required to accurately represent the population of
aviation maintenance technicians. Males (87%) represented the majority of the sample and
females represented only 13%. The researcher recruited participants by directly addressing
AMT classes. All Participants in the study completed the "Regulations, Documentation and
Drawing" course before participating. This course (AMS 118) specifically includes privileges
and limitations of FAR Parts 43, 65, and 91 pertinent to aircraft maintenance and the associated
documents, publications, and records applicable to the AMT. This requirement ensured that
participants had enough knowledge in maintenance documentation to provide consistency when
reading all related written materials associated with the task. A brief assessment, administered
during participant introduction, verified that participants understood the importance of
Airworthiness Directives, what purpose workcards serve, as well as the effective use of a digital
multi-meter and torque wrench. All participants indicated a proficiency in reading and writing
the English language.
Materials
Demographics form. Participants completed a demographics form (see appendix A) that
asked their gender, age, English proficiency, if they have completed the AMS 118 course or
equivalent, which mechanic ratings they held, as well as their knowledge of torque wrenches,
digital multi-meters, and basic hand tools.
Consent form. Participants completed and signed a written consent form to
acknowledge their participation in the study (see appendix B). The consent form described the
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purpose of the study, the expected duration of participation, benefits and risks to the participant,
confidentiality, and the voluntary nature of the study.
Written documentation packet. All participants received the same "written
documentation packet" which included a work card, an airworthiness directive, and pertinent
sections from a maintenance manual (see Appendix C). The work card contained step-by-step
instructions to complete the maintenance task. Each step includes a space where the technician
must place their initials after it is completed. The airworthiness directive constituted a required
inspection of a specific section of the alternator. The FAA issues airworthiness directives when
certain safety issues dictate a change in the performance of a part or inspection method. AMTs
must comply with airworthiness directives or face severe punishment. The pertinent pages from
the maintenance manual contain detailed step-by-step instructions on how to disassemble,
inspect, repair, and reassemble the alternator. The researcher designed these documents
exclusively for this study.
Tool pack. Each participant received a standardized ―tool pack‖ that included the
following tools: pencil and paper, standard size socket set with ratchet, inch-pound torque
wrench, and digital multi-meter. All participants completed a preliminary evaluation with the
inch-pound torque wrench and digital multi meter before entering the study.
Work area. Participants completed the maintenance task in an isolated room. The room
contained enough space for the participant to efficiently work on the alternator, as well as
provided a suitable environment for a shift turnover to occur.
Experimental task. The maintenance task consisted of a Delco-Remy Model K5
alternator. The researcher disassembled, cleaned, inspected, and reassembled the alternator prior
to use in the experiment. Because there was no available written maintenance manual for this
particular alternator, the researcher developed a unique set of maintenance manual pages based
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on other models of alternators. For convenience, the researcher removed the springs that retained
pressure for each brush from the alternator. At the beginning of each participant trial, the
researcher disassembled the alternator to a predetermined state to simulate the work performed
by the previous shift. To complete the maintenance task, the participant inspected and
reassembled the alternator. The common parts of a typical alternator are presented in figure 2 to
aid the reader.

Figure 2. Common parts of a typical alternator.
Trigger event errors. The experimental task included three trigger events for
participants to capture and correct. The trigger events represented common occurrences in
aviation incidents and accidents that involved shift turnovers, as depicted in the literature (see
Parke and Kanki, 2008).
Documentation event. The maintenance documentation purposely did not include the
importance of the alignment marks between the case and body of the alternator. Instead, the step
on the workcard only read, ―Install case onto body*‖. The asterisk pointed to important
information that would normally be located on the corresponding step in the maintenance
manual. However, the maintenance manual pages provided no mention of the case alignment.
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The case and the body pieces make up the frame of the alternator and alignment of these
components is necessary for proper alternator operation. The researcher placed a mark on both
the case and body, approximately ¼ inches long for alignment purposes. For participants in the
face-to-face condition, the previous shift actor mentioned the lack of notation of the alignment
marks in the maintenance manual. However, for those participants in the written condition, only
good judgment provided the means to capture the alignment marks. A successful error capture
occurred when the participant correctly aligned the case and body.
Existing installation event. An incorrectly installed part (diode) by the researcher
simulated an installation error performed by the previous shift. A diagram provided a visual
reference of the correctly installed diode. A successful error capture occurred when participants
correctly identified the incorrectly installed diode and either voiced concerned to the manager or
corrected the error and documented it on the workcard.
Procedural event. An airworthiness directive (AD) described a change to the torque
value of the four case bolts (from 25 to 28-inch pounds), simulating a change in procedure. A
successful error capture occurred when the participant complied with the AD by applying the
correct torque to the case bolts and most importantly, documenting compliance of the AD on the
workcard.
Design
This study followed a 2 x 2 between subjects, fully factorial design. The first
independent variable was time pressure and had two levels. In the first level, time pressure was
present, where participants completed a maintenance task within a time limit (20 minutes). In
the second level, time pressure was absent, which allowed participants to complete the task
without any intervention, unless they exceeded a 35-minute time constraint for study purposes.
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The second independent variable was shift turnover strategy and had two levels. In the
first level, written documentation was the primary means of information transfer. In the second
level, both written and face-to-face communication was exchanged.
Independent variables
Written. The purpose of the written level of the independent variable was to simulate a
shift turnover that only involved written literature left behind from the previous shift technician,
which is the standard practice in aviation maintenance organizations. It was comprised of select
maintenance manual pages, a workcard, and an airworthiness directive, all of which make up the
―written documentation packet‖ (see Appendix C). The workcard was designed to be used as a
step-by-step reference; however, a truly accurate understanding of the experimental task is
achieved when the workcard was used in conjunction with the maintenance manual pages and
the airworthiness directive. Participants solely relied on the information contained in the
―written documentation packet‖ to complete the experimental task.
Face-to-face. The purpose of this level of the independent variable was to simulate a
shift turnover that involved a face-to-face briefing with the previous shift technician. It served as
a means for adding redundancy to the maintenance literature, while providing an opportunity for
the participant to develop a complete understanding of the overall task. Particulars discussed
included, what steps of the task the previous shift technician had completed and which step to
complete next, any abnormalities in the maintenance literature. Additionally, the briefing
provided the participant with an opportunity to ask questions about the task. To provide a
consistent briefing, the shift change actor, following a script, described the overall task as well
as, what, why, and how they performed each step. The actor also specifically mentioned three
trigger events in a manner that encouraged the participant to investigate the errors. The
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participants in this condition also received all of the written information that the "written" group
received.
Time pressure. The purpose of this independent variable was to simulate a situation
where completion of the experimental task required a short time frame. In commercial aviation
organizations, a constant pressure to retain aircraft in a ―flight ready‖ status is prevalent. This
time pressure may adversely affect the AMT, causing slips in maintenance tasks. Participants
were subjected either to time pressure (20 minutes) or to no time pressure. In the time pressure
conditions, the manager actor, following a script, reminded participants of the due back time
periodically as they completed the experimental task (i.e., 15, 10, 5, and 2 minutes remaining).
Participants exceeding the 35-minute study time constraint were stopped and evaluated by the
researcher in a manner to which the participant would explain any remaining steps to be
completed.
Dependent variables
Three distinct variables measured participant performance: task completion time, number
of skill-based errors, and number of three trigger events errors. The manager actor used a
stopwatch to measure total time of task completion. This period started once the participant
began working on the task and then stopped when they reported to the manager. The researcher
evaluated the number of skill-based errors using a task evaluation sheet (see Appendix D). Skillbased errors occurred when the participant did not read and/or not adhere to the maintenance
manual (e.g., assembling alternator parts incorrectly). The researcher measured three distinct
trigger events using the task evaluation sheet. An airworthiness directive simulated a trigger
event that represented a change in task procedure; a missing reference in the maintenance manual
simulated a trigger event that represented a documentation error; and finally, an incorrectly
installed part simulated a trigger event that represented a previous technician installation error.
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Table 2 provides a brief description of each task, the possible number of errors, the type of error
associated, and measurement procedure. Evaluation of errors took place after the participant left
the experiment.
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Table 2
List of tasks and type of measurement used for each task.

Task

Number of Possible
Errors
Skill-Based Trigger Event

Install stator onto
body [30 inch/lbs]

Did participant recognize previous
shift installation error and place diode
in correct position? Yes or No?

1

Check position of
diode

Did participant check the torque value
of three nuts @ 30 inch/lbs? Torque
value of nuts within ± 1 inch/lb?

3

Assemble case to
body

Evaluation

1

Did participant align the case and
body correctly, using the alignment
marks? Yes or No?

1

Did participant check the torque value
of four bolts @ 35 inch/lbs (per AD37748)? Torque value of bolts within
± 1 inch/lb?

Secure case to
body [35 inch/lbs]

4

Attach fan and
spacer to shaft

2

Did participant install the spacer and
fan correctly? Yes or No?

Attach pulley,
lock washer, and
nut to shaft

3

Did participant install the parts in the
correct order? Yes or No?

Total Errors

12

3

Manipulation check. Participants completed a reaction survey that presented statements
about their perception of the shift turnover effectiveness, their perception of time pressure, and
their thought of crosschecking a previous shift technicians work (see Appendix E). Participants
rated the statements using a 5-point Likert scale (i.e., 1- strongly agree, 5-strongly disagree).
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Procedure
Experimental task setup. Before the beginning of each run of a participant, the
experimenter used a checklist to ensure the proper set up of the alternator. The researcher setup
the participant briefing area, which included a consent form, a demographics form, a
maintenance survey, a task evaluation sheet, and the participant introduction script. The
researcher briefed the manager and shift turnover actor on the conditions of the day, and
provided the appropriate scripts. The researcher placed the alternator and the tools in the work
area in a disassembled state. Specifically, the disassembled alternator replicated the previous
shifts completion of steps 1-7 on the workcard. Figure 3 provides a photographic representation
of the work area as presented to participants.

Figure 3. Layout of alternator and tools on work area.
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Participant Briefing. Participants received one of four conditions: written with time
pressure, face-to-face, written, or face-to-face with time pressure. Each participant read and
signed a consent form. The researcher answered any questions about the consent form before
proceeding. Participants then filled out a demographics form. Following the introduction script,
the researcher briefed participants about the study dependent on the condition assigned to them
(see Participant Introduction, Appendix F). After the briefing concluded, participants met the
manger, who assigned them to a condition. The manager then read a script pertaining to the
condition. The four conditions follow.
Written with time pressure. Participants in this condition received no verbal
communication from the outgoing shift. Instead, they received a task assignment and the written
documentation packet from the manager. The manager instructed participants to complete the
task in 20 minutes. The manager provided no support to participants once he left the work area
and returned to the manager‘s desk. The condition simulated a busy working environment, as
the particular task used in this study required no additional help from others once the participant
began the task. The manager started a stopwatch as he left to return to the manager‘s desk. The
manager walked back to the work area and reminded the participant of the due back time at four
separate intervals: 15, 10, 5, and 2 minutes remaining, respectively, with an increase in
demanding vocal tone for each reminder (see Managers Script, Appendix F). The manager
stopped the stopwatch when participants indicated a completion of the task. The manager
documented total time of task completion for each participant. The manger actor received
training on projecting himself as a managerial figure.
Face-to-face with time pressure. Participants in this condition received instructions
from the manager to relieve an outgoing shift (shift turnover actor) from the task. The shift
turnover actor provided participants with the written documentation packet, and a thorough
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briefing of the task. Additionally, the shift turnover actor provided answers to any questions
posed by participants about the task (see Shift Turnover Actors Script, Appendix F). Once the
briefing concluded, the actor notified participants of a due back time of 20 minutes. The
manager started a stopwatch when the shift turnover actor returned to the manager‘s desk. The
manager reminded participants of the due back time at four separate intervals: 15, 10, 5, and 2
minutes remaining, respectively, with an increase in demanding vocal tone for each reminder.
The manager provided no support to participants.
The shift turnover actor served as a subject matter expert in aviation maintenance and
shift briefings. The actor received training on how to communicate aspects related to the task
assertively and accurately. The shift turnover actor‘s script followed the ―checklist for effective
shift handovers‖, developed by Parke and Mishkin (2005) from shift change literature. The
checklist reveals a method of efficient and thorough communication that should occur during a
shift turnover. The checklist ensured that participants received an efficient and thorough shift
turnover.
Written. Participants in this condition received no verbal communication from the
outgoing shift. Instead, the manager gave participants the written documentation packet, and
then instructed them to complete the task. The manager provided no support to participants.
Face-to-face. Participants in this condition received instructions from the manager to
relieve an outgoing shift (shift turnover actor) from the task. The shift turnover actor provided
participants with the written documentation packet, and a thorough briefing of the task.
Additionally, the shift turnover actor provided answers to any questions posed by participants
about the task. The manager provided no support to participants.
Once finished with the task, the manager guided participants to the researcher‘s desk.
Each participant filled out a reaction survey. The researcher provided a debriefing (see appendix
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G) and dismissed participants from the area. Table 3 represents a structural breakdown of the
procedure.
Table 3
Average times of each phase of study for time pressure conditions in minutes.
Condition
Phase
Written
Face-to-Face
Participant introduction
5
5
Participant reads and signs out consent form
3
3
Participant fills out Demographics form
1
1
Participant receives shift turnover
5
15
Participant completes maintenance task
25
22
Participant fills out survey
3
3
Participant receives debriefing and leaves
3
3
Researcher inspects alternator for errors
12
12
Researcher ―resets‖ alternator for next participant
2
2
Total Duration
56
66
Note: Participants in conditions without time pressure were allocated an additional 15 minutes to
complete the maintenance task.
Data collection
Error check. The researcher inspected the assembled alternator following the ―Task
Evaluation Sheet‖. This sheet describes what errors the researcher must look for in the
inspection. The researcher documented the total number of skill-based errors and trigger event
errors.
Task Completion Time. The manager actor documented total task duration using a
stopwatch. Task time began when either the manager or shift turnover actor assigned the
participant the task. Task time ended when the participant indicated they were finished with the
task.
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Results
The purpose of this study was to determine the effect of shift turnover strategy (face-toface or written) and time pressure on error capture, accuracy, and completion time of a
maintenance task that was shared between two shifts. It was hypothesized that AMTs subjected
to a written shift turnover strategy would make more errors and would require more time to
complete a maintenance task than AMTs who received a face-to-face shift turnover strategy.
Additionally, it was hypothesized that AMTs under time pressure would make more errors than
AMTs not under time pressure. Finally, it was hypothesized that the type of shift turnover
strategy would moderate the effect of time pressure on performance, such that; AMTs who
received a face-to-face shift turnover strategy would be less impacted by time pressure than
AMTs who received a written shift turnover strategy.
Results from three dependent measures evaluated AMT performance. The first
dependent measure examined the number of skill-based errors made on the maintenance task,
such as incorrect torque values for bolts or incorrect placement of parts. The second dependent
measure examined the AMTs ability to recognize three trigger events, specifically, compliance
with an airworthiness directive, alignment marks on the alternator, and an incorrectly installed
part by the previous shift3. The third dependent measure examined the amount of time
participants needed to complete the maintenance task. Finally, for verification of manipulation
strength, a reaction survey provided perceptions of the shift turnover strategy and time pressure.
Table 4 lists inter-item correlations for all dependent measures and reaction survey composite
variables.

3

This trigger event provided little variability, as the majority of participants did not recognize the
installation error, thereby warranting exclusion from analysis
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Table 4
Correlations for Dependent Measures and Reaction Survey Composite Variables

Dependent Measure
Trigger Event Errors
Skill Based Errors
Task Completion
Time (minutes)
Shift Turnover
Perception
Time Pressure
Perception

Trigger Event
Errors

Skill Based
Errors

Task
Completion
Time
(minutes)

Shift
Turnover
Perception

Time
Pressure
Perception

1
.011

1

.068

.166

1

-0.072

-0.055

-0.314*

1

0.266

-0.291

-0.267

0.106

1

* Denotes significance at the .05 level (two-tailed)
To accommodate the two independent variables and three dependent measures, a twoway multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was used for this study. A Box‘s M test was
not significant, F(18, 4579.73) = 1.23, p = .224, indicating the assumption of homogeneity of
covariance was not violated. The following sub-sections present the results based upon
hypotheses.
Main Effects
Shift turnover strategy. Hypothesis 1 was comprised of two parts, the first of which
concerned the effect of shift turnover strategy on error rate in a shared maintenance task (H1a)
and the second of which concerned the effect of shift turnover strategy on task completion time
(H1b). The multivariate test showed a significant main effect for shift turnover strategy on
performance, Hotelling‘s Trace, F(3, 34) = 4.49, p = .009, partial ή2 = .284, observed power =
.840. According to partial eta2, shift turnover strategy accounted for 28 % of variance in the
combined dependent variables. Univariate tests provided the specific effect of shift turnover
strategy on each dependent measure (see Table 5).
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Table 5
Univariate F-test results for effect of shift turnover strategy on dependent measures.
Dependent Measure

F

p

Partial ή2

Power

Trigger Event Errors

9.28

.004

.205

.843

Skill-based Errors

2.92

.096

.075

.383

Task Completion Time

2.27

.141

.059

.311

Specifically, AMTs who received a written turnover strategy made significantly more
trigger event errors (M = 1.4, SD = 0.82) than AMTs who received a face-to-face turnover
strategy (M = 0.70, SD = 0.66), as the univariate test revealed, F(1, 36) = 9.28; p = .004, partial
ή2 = .205, observed power = .843. Shift turnover strategy accounted for 20.5% of the variance in
trigger event errors. AMTs who received a written turnover strategy made more skill-based
errors (M = 1.10, SD = 1.17) than AMTs who received a face-to-face turnover strategy (M =
0.55, SD = 0.83), however, this difference was not statistically significant with the univariate
test, F(1, 36) = 2.92; p = .096, partial ή2 = .075, observed power = .383. These results partially
support hypothesis H1a, in that AMTs who received a written turnover made more trigger event
errors than AMTs who received a face-to-face turnover, but no significant difference appeared
between the groups on skill-based errors.
With respect to task completion time (H1b), AMTs who received a written turnover
required more time to complete the maintenance task (M = 24.76 minutes, SD = 8.49) than
AMTs who received a face-to-face turnover (M = 21.38 minutes, SD = 7.18). However, the
univariate test found these means did not differ significantly, F(1, 36) = 2.27; p = .141, partial ή2
= .059, observed power = .31. These results do not support hypothesis H1b, which stated that
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AMTs subjected to a written shift turnover would take longer to perform a maintenance task than
AMTs who received a face-to-face turnover.
Time pressure. Hypothesis 2 predicted an effect of time pressure on error rate. The
multivariate test showed a significant main effect for the presence of time pressure, Hotelling‘s
Trace, F(3, 34) = 4.99, p = .006, partial ή2 = .306, observed power = .880. Next, univariate tests
provided the specific effect of time pressure on each dependent measure (see Table 6).
Table 6
Univariate F-test results for effect of time pressure on the dependent measures.
Dependent Measure

F

p

Partial ή2

Power

Trigger Event Errors

3.03

.090

.078

.396

Skill-based Errors

1.18

.284

.032

.185

Task Completion Time

10.48

.003

.225

.883

Although AMTs who were subjected to time pressure made less skill-based errors (M =
0.65, SD = 0.93) than AMTs not under time pressure (M = 1.00, SD = 1.12), the univariate test
indicated that these means did not differ significantly, F(1, 36) = 1.18; p = .284, partial ή2 = .032,
observed power = .185. Similarly, while AMTs subjected to time pressure made more trigger
event errors (M = 1.25, SD = 0.85) than AMTs not under time pressure (M = 0.85, SD = .75), the
subsequent univariate test indicated that time pressure did not have a significant effect on trigger
event errors, F(1, 36) = 3.03; p = .090, partial ή2 = .078, observed power = .396. In contrast,
AMTs under time pressure completed the maintenance task significantly faster (M = 19.44
minutes, SD = 6.23) than AMTs not under time pressure (M = 26.70 minutes, SD = 7.94), F(1,
36) = 10.48; p = .003, partial ή2 = .225, observed power = .883. Thus, time pressure accounted
for 22.5% of the variance in task completion time. These results do not support the hypothesis
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that AMTs subjected to time pressure would make more errors than AMTs who were given
ample time to complete a maintenance task.
Interaction Effect
Hypothesis 3 predicted that turnover strategy would moderate the effect of time pressure
on performance. The multivariate test showed no significant interaction effect, Wilks‘ Lambda,
F(3, 34) = .465, p = .709, partial ή2 = .039, observed power = .134. While, AMTs who received
a face-to-face turnover performed better across all dependent measures than AMTs who received
a written turnover (see table 7), no comparisons yielded a significant difference between groups.
Therefore, the hypothesis that AMTs who received a face-to-face turnover would be less
impacted by time pressure than AMTs who received a written shift turnover was not statistically
supported. Figures 4, 5, and 6 show the skill-based errors, trigger event errors, and task
completion time for all study conditions.
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Table 7
Means and Standard Deviations of Interactions by Dependent Measures.
Dependent
Measure
Skill-based Errors

Trigger Event
Errors

Task Completion
Time

Turnover
Strategy

Time Pressure
Condition

M

SD

Written

Present
Absent

1.00
1.20

1.15
1.23

Face-to-face

Present
Absent

0.30
0.80

0.48
1.03

Written

Present
Absent

1.70
1.10

0.67
0.88

Face-to-face

Present
Absent

0.80
0.60

0.79
0.52

Written

Present
Absent

20.58
28.95

7.40
7.65

Face-to-face

Present
Absent

18.31
24.46

4.93
7.98
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Figure 4. Mean Skill-based Errors by Shift Turnover Strategy and Time Pressure.

Figure 5. Mean Trigger Event Errors by Shift Turnover Strategy and Time Pressure.
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Figure 6. Mean Task Completion Time by Shift Turnover Strategy and Time Pressure.
Reaction Survey
The reaction survey included ten statements. Four statements measured the perception of
effectiveness of the shift turnover, four statements measured the perception of time pressure
during the task, and one statement measured the perception of trust of in the previous shift.
Participants rated their agreement of the statements using a 5-point scale (1 – strongly disagree, 2
– disagree, 3 – neutral, 4 – agree, 5 – strongly agree). All participants completed the survey
immediately after finishing the maintenance task. A Pearson‘s product-moment correlation
coefficient was computed to assess the relationship between the statements. Table 8 lists all
statements and their respective correlations.
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Table 8
Summary of Inter-item Correlations for Reaction Survey Statements
Statement
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

1

2

3

4

5

.399*
-.189
.591**
.652**
.228

1
-.019
.593**
.213
.252

1
-.040
-.245
.051

-.309
.142
-.061

*

6

7

8

9

10

1
**

.590
.703**
-.019
.805**
.356*
.347*
*

-.337
.095
-.013

1

-.317
.098
-.151

*

.396
.289
.628**

1
*

.340
.378*
*

-.388
-.005
-.152

1
-.089

1

-.195
.251
-.055

-.160
-.056
-.078

1
-.081
1
*
**
.402
.509

1

**. Denotes significance at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Denotes significance at the 0.05 level (2tailed).

1. I had a good understanding of how to inspect and reassemble the alternator correctly.
2. The previous shift technician provided a clear picture of what work had been done to the
alternator.
3. All information required to complete the task was in the documentation.
4. I felt pressured to finish the alternator task quickly.
5. I fully understood each and every step of the task.
6. I am confident that the previous shift technician completed every step correctly.
7. I always look-over someone else's work before I sign-off on a task.
8. I had plenty of time to finish the alternator task.
9. I was aware the alternator had a "due back time" and I tried to finish the task quickly.
10. I was in a hurry to finish the alternator task.

With respect to the effectiveness of the shift turnover, statements 1, 2, 5, and 6 fit well
together (Cronbach‘s alpha = .83), which resulted in the formation of a composite variable that
represented whether participants felt the shift turnover they received was effective in transferring
information related to completion of the task. With respect to the effectiveness of time pressure,
statements 4, 8, and 10 fit well together (Cronbach‘s alpha = .73), which resulted in the
formation of a composite variable that represented whether participants felt pressured to finish
the task quickly. Statements 3, 7, and 9 did not fit well with any other statements and were not
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included in analysis. Tables 9 and 10 summarize the means and standard deviations of shift
turnover perception and perception of time pressure, respectively.
Table 9
Means and Standard Deviations for Perception Shift Turnover Effectiveness

Turnover Strategy

Perception of Shift Turnover
Effectiveness
M (SD)

Written

3.14 (0.86)

Face-to-face

4.03 (0.82)

Table 10
Means and Standard Deviations for Perception of Time Pressure

Time Pressure condition

Perception of Time Pressure
M (SD)

Present

3.56 (0.56)

Absent

2.70 (0.58)

An Independent samples t-test determined any significant difference in responses for both
shift turnover and time pressure conditions. When asked about shift turnover perception, those
who received a written shift turnover felt the turnover was significantly less effective (M = 3.14,
SD = .86) than those who received a face-to-face shift turnover (M = 4.03, SD = .82), t(38) = 3.34, p < .05. When asked if participants felt the need to complete the task quickly, those who
were under time pressure felt significantly more pressured to complete the task quickly (M =
3.56, SD = .56) than those who received no time pressure (M = 2.7, SD = .58), t(38) = 4.82, p <
.05.
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Discussion
The purpose of this study was to determine if shift turnover strategy and time pressure
affect AMT performance on a maintenance task shared between shifts. Many issues affect
AMTs, however, situations that combine both time pressure and communication between shift
technicians may have led to accidents such as Alaska Airlines Flight 261. Though past research
has proposed a possible relationship between shift turnover strategy and errors (Maddox, 1998;
Miles, 1998; Parke & Kanki, 2008, etc.), the majority of available data is based on self-reported
incidents. Research does indicate that people under time pressure are more likely to make more
errors when performing a task then people given ample time (Lin & Su, 1998; Chu & Spires,
2001). Some results from the current study provide empirical support to the argument for the
need of face-to-face shift turnovers in aviation maintenance, especially when different shifts
share a maintenance task. The following sections provide interpretation of the results.
Effect of Shift Turnover Strategy
To examine an effect of shift turnover strategy, the current study used two shift turnover
strategies. The first, a written shift turnover strategy, simulated a situation where the outgoing
shift technician generated a shift turnover report (work card) for the incoming shift technician to
complete an unfinished maintenance task. The second, a face-to-face shift turnover strategy,
simulated a situation where the outgoing shift technician verbally briefed the incoming shift
technician about an unfinished maintenance task. In the current study, AMTs given the written
shift turnover strategy made significantly more trigger event errors than AMTs given the face-toface shift turnover strategy. These results were expected, as during the face-to-face turnover, the
outgoing shift informed AMTs about the airworthiness directive and case alignment marks
(trigger events) during the verbal briefing. In contrast, the written documentation packet
provided no information about the alignment marks, but included the airworthiness directive.
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AMTs who received a written turnover strategy had to recognize both trigger events by their own
investigation. A great effort is made by publishers of maintenance literature to include any
critical information (e.g. alignment marks) in documentation. However, inconsistent quality and
lack of standardization across publishers of maintenance literature is prevalent (see Chaparro,
Groff, Chaparro, & Scarlet, 2002) and therefore this reality was replicated in this study by
excluding any statement of the alignment marks. These results indicate that how task specific
knowledge is shared via, in this study, a face-to-face turnover, can make a significant difference
in the interpretation and use of that knowledge. The face-to-face strategy allowed the incoming
technician to pose questions about the task, communicate concerns, gain perspective on the task,
and acquire critical information that may have otherwise been assumed knowledge. The results
partially support the hypothesis that AMTs given a written turnover strategy would make more
errors than AMTs given a face-to-face shift turnover strategy.
Regarding skill-based errors, no significant difference existed between the two groups.
The experimental task and the performance measures may be the reason why the predicted effect
did not occur. Specifically, the design of the maintenance task included 12 possible points to
make skill-based errors. These errors consisted of AMTs not applying the correct torque to bolts
and AMTs not installing components of the alternator correctly. Two limitations guided the
selection of the 12 possible errors. The first limitation was the length of the time to complete
data collection. The researcher designed the task to allow a completion time limit of 35 minutes
for each participant. This limitation allowed data collection to occur within a reasonable time
frame for a thesis project. Therefore, the researcher designed the task to exclude lengthy
procedures found in actual aircraft maintenance, such as safety wiring. In a real-world setting,
maintenance tasks are much more complex and may require many hours to complete.
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The second limitation was mechanical experience level of participants. In order to recruit
a sizable sample of participants for the current study, recruitment was targeted to students who
had finished the General portion of AMT training. These students met the requirement of
completing a course on maintenance documentation and aviation law. However, they were not
required to have the knowledge and skill as a fully licensed aircraft mechanic. Therefore, the
researcher designed the maintenance task with just enough difficulty for a novice mechanic to
understand.
Ultimately, the simplification of the task resulted in a ceiling effect on scores. AMTs in
both turnover strategies made a low number of skill-based errors. The means show a small
improvement in performance for AMTs that received the face-to-face strategy compared to
AMTs that received the written strategy. Perhaps if a greater length of time was allocated to
accommodate a more complex task, a significant difference in skill-based errors may have
appeared between shift strategies. Further research is recommended to determine if shift
turnover strategy will have a significant effect on skill-based errors.
It was hypothesized that AMTs given the written strategy would take longer to complete
the task than AMTs given the face-to-face turnover strategy. Shift turnover strategy had no
significant effect on task completion time. AMTs in both turnover strategies took about the same
amount of time to complete the task. This result may also be attributed to the simplicity of the
task described previously. Additionally, the manner in which the information was presented in
the face-to-face turnover was intended to help the AMT gain a better understanding of the task.
It is possible that too much information was communicated during the face-to-face turnover.
Perhaps AMTs in the face-to-face turnover did not effectively retain the information the
outgoing shift presented to them, which ultimately led to a comparative understanding that the
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written turnover had of the task. Once they begun the task, they may have forgotten a portion of
the information presented in the briefing.
Effect of time pressure
This study used two levels of time pressure. The first level, time pressure present,
essentially required AMTs to complete the maintenance task within an allocated amount of time,
while being subjected to constant reminders of a ―due back time‖ by the manager (actor). This
condition simulated a maintenance task with a short deadline be returned to an aircraft awaiting
departure. The second level, time pressure absent, allowed AMTs ample amount of time to
complete the task and no reminders from the ―manager‖. It was hypothesized that AMTs under
time pressure would make more errors than AMTs given an ample amount of time to complete
the task; however, the results do not support the hypothesis.
Since increases in workload, which can be due to time pressure, is well known to impact
human performance (Staal, 2004), it is likely the lack of effect in this study was due to the
manipulation of time pressure. That is, the manipulation of time pressure was not strong enough
to put the participants in a high workload/high stress environment. Interestingly, however, the
participants in the high time pressure condition performed the task in significantly less time.
Additionally, the reaction survey indicated that participants in the high time pressure condition
felt significantly more time pressure than the participants in the low time pressure condition.
Now consider the curvilinear relationship between workload and performance. If a person is
subjected to low workload, their performance tends to suffer. A medium amount of workload
tends to stimulate a person enough to achieve the best performance. Finally, people subjected to
high workload tend to become overwhelmed, and thus their performance degrades. (see
Hancock & Szalma, 2008). AMTs in the no time pressure condition received very little
stimulation and their performance was slightly worse (although not statistically different) than
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those exposed to the high time pressure condition. It may be that the high time pressure
condition actually was just a moderate amount of stimulation given by the reminders by the
manager. However, the reminders were not strong enough to overload AMTs to a point where
performance would begin to degrade. Essentially, AMTs may have been pressured just enough
to perform effectively. Perhaps the method of reminders used in this study may not represent
other forms of time pressure AMTs experience. Possibly a situation where AMTs were actually
working on an actual aircraft that was waiting for departure may provide a stronger
representation of time pressure in future research.
Further refinement of the task and measures also may have enabled greater assessment of
the effect of time pressure on performance. Perhaps different types of skill-based errors and
trigger events should be evaluated.
Effect of time pressure and shift turnover strategy on performance
The results indicated no significant interaction between shift turnover strategy and time
pressure. This is attributed to the combination of a simple maintenance task and a weak
manipulation of time pressure. However, increasing the difficulty of the maintenance task and
strengthening the manipulation of time pressure may result in a significant interaction.
Future research
Environment. The environment in which participants received briefings and completed
the maintenance task simulated a small component repair station, where working in a quiet,
climate-controlled environment is commonplace. This environment was well suited to provide
internal validity for this study. However, as stated previously, the majority of aviation
maintenance is performed in a hanger environment. Factors such as lighting, temperature, noise,
and distractions make up a typical hanger environment. Therefore, a replication of this study in
an active maintenance hangar may provide a more accurate assessment of AMT performance.
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AMT experience level. The participants in this study were not certificated AMTs, but
students in an AMT program that had completed enough training to understand the importance
of the written documentation packet, the regulations surrounding aviation maintenance, and most
importantly, the rights and responsibilities of an AMT. A third trigger event involved AMTs
recognizing a mistake made by the outgoing shift. Specifically, the diode of the alternator was
incorrectly installed with the intent of AMTs discovering and correcting the error.
Unfortunately, the majority of AMTs missed this error (77%) and subsequently, this trigger
event was removed from all analysis. It is possible that the average experience level with
alternators was not high enough for AMTs to recognize the incorrectly installed part, even
though the maintenance manual indicated all applicable parts to for the task and inspection of the
diode was a required step that was already completed by the outgoing shift. This trigger event
was removed from analysis.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the current study partially supports the argument to require face-to-face
shift turnover strategies in aviation maintenance. Conceivably, use of the face-to-face strategy
helped increase AMTs understanding of the task. The outgoing shift actor explained how he
completed each step of the task and indicated which step was next. Additionally, the outgoing
shift actor was available to answer any questions AMTs had about the task. The results of the
reaction survey substantiate this notion as AMTs in the face-to-face strategy perceived the shift
turnover as helpful and effective. Additionally, a level of inter-shift trust may have increased
confidence levels for AMTs in the face-to-face strategy, which has been shown to be trait of
AMTs (Taylor & Thomas, 2003).
Written shift turnover reports may be difficult to interpret, poorly written and may not
contain critical information, such as procedural changes. The latter is based on assumptions by
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the outgoing technician that the incoming technician would already know any procedurals
changes. Therefore, the common practice of the outgoing shift generating and distributing
written shift turnover reports to the incoming shift, without any verbal briefing may not provide
the most effective means of information transfer.
Additional research on this topic is needed to identify which types of errors are mitigated
by the use of face-to-face turnover strategies. Researchers should make the following
considerations when designing an aviation maintenance shift turnover study: a) the difficulty of
the maintenance task should reflect the experience level of AMTs performing the task, b) if
possible, published maintenance literature specific to the task should be used, c) a suitable
amount of trigger event errors should be assigned to the maintenance task, d) the task should
allow the possibility of skill based errors to occur, e) the shift turnover should consider all the
best practices supported by the literature (Maddox, 1998; Miles, 1998; Federal Aviation
Administration, 2005; Parke & Kanki, 2008).
An ideal study would take place in an active maintenance hangar that practices the
written turnover strategy; perhaps with a task that is commonly performed by the AMTs who
work there, so that the additional effect of complacency can be measured.
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Appendix A
Demographics Form
Please answer the following questions honestly and accurately.
What is your gender?

Male or Female

What is your age?

_______

Are you proficient in reading and
writing the English language?

Yes or No

Have you completed the ―Regulations, Documentation,
and Drawing‖ course (AMS 111) or equivalent?

Yes or No

Do you currently hold any FAA mechanic ratings
(A, P or A&P)?

Yes or No

If ―yes‖, list all ratings _________________________________
Are you able to determine ―continuity‖ using a digital multi-meter?

Yes or No

Are you able to use an inch/lb torque wrench?

Yes or No

Are you able to use basic hand tools?

Yes or No
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Appendix B
Participant Information
Measurement of task completion after shift change
Conducted by William R. Warren
Advisor: Dr. Elizabeth Blickensderfer
Embry Riddle Aeronautical University
600 S. Clyde Morris Blvd.
Daytona Beach, FL 32114
Purpose of Research
This study will measure your ability to complete an unfinished maintenance task. The researcher
will provide all related material to complete the task.
Duration of Participation
A total commitment of 2 hours is required for participation.
Benefits to the Individual
Participants who complete the task will receive an entry ticket into a drawing for a $300 gift card
for tools. The ticket shall contain your name and choice of contact information (phone number
or email). The winner will have the choice of a gift card valued at $300 from one of the
following tool retailers: Snap-on ™, Matco ™, or Craftsman ™. A single ticket will be drawn
from a box in the presence of the researcher‘s committee at the conclusion of the study. The
winner will be notified via phone and email.
Risks to the Individual
There are no known risks associated with this study. Safety glasses will be available for use, but
are not required.
Confidentiality
Participation in this study is anonymous. You will be assigned a number, and only that number
will be used while recording and reporting data. All data will be kept in a locked file cabinet in
the Department of Human Factors and Systems at Embry-Riddle.
Voluntary Nature of Participation
I acknowledge that my participation in this research is voluntary and that I may stop participating
at any time. I understand that withdrawal from the study negates entry into the tool prize. I have
been informed of the general scientific purposes of this study. You may request a copy of this
consent form, as well as, a copy of the results of this research by contacting William R. Warren
(warre88c@erau.edu) or Dr. Elizabeth Blickensderfer (elizabeth.blickensderfer@erau.edu).
62

Statement of Consent
Embry Riddle Aeronautical University
I consent to participating in the research project entitled: Measurement of Task Completion
after Shift Change.
Researcher: William R. Warren

The individual above has explained the purpose of the study, the procedures to be followed, and
the expected duration of my participation. I have read the page labeled ―Participant Information‖
and agree to the conditions of the study. Possible benefits of the study have been described, as
have alternate procedures, if such procedures are applicable and available.
I certify that I have met the following requirements:
o Completed the ―Regulations, Documentation, and Drawing‖ course (AMS 111) or
posses an Airframe or Powerplant Certification or combination (A&P).
o Have knowledge of basic hand tool use (including torque wrench and digital
multi-meter)
o Ability to read and write the English language
I acknowledge that I have had the opportunity to obtain additional information regarding the
study and that any questions I have raised have been answered to my full satisfaction.
Furthermore, I understand that I am free to withdraw consent at any time and to discontinue
participation in the study without prejudice to me. I understand that withdrawal from the study
negates entry into the tool prize.
Finally, I acknowledge that I have read and fully understand the consent form. I sign it freely
and voluntarily.
______________
Date
_________________________________________
Participant‘s Name (please print)
_________________________________________
Participant‘s Signature
_________________________________________
Researcher Signature
_____Yes, I would like to be contacted regarding the results of the study.
_____Yes, I would like to be entered into the tool drawing (phone number & email required).
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Appendix C
Written Documentation Packet
Maintenance Manuel Pages

Vent Ace Model 100-F

Service Manual Rev. 3

Delco-Remy Model K5 Alternator Repair
Disassembly
1-Remove Pulley. Place a number 8 Allen wrench in center of
the shaft and loosen nut with a 15/16 wrench.
2-Remove fan and two spacers. *Note placement of spacers
and fan.
3-Remove four case screws using a 5/16 deep well socket,
loosen the four case bolts. Retain washers with bolts.
4-Separate case from body. Carefully slide case off center
shaft.
5-Remove rotor from body. Grasp center shaft and carefully
pull out rotor from body
6- Remove stator from body. Remove the two nuts, and lift
the stator from the body.

Diode Inspection
Note: The internal components of this alternator are
delicate. Handle with care.
7- Remove Diode. Remove the two bolts and lift the
diode out of the body. *Note position of diode in
diagram.
Check for continuity between the two terminals of the
diode.
If no continuity, diode is ok.
Install diode. Hand tighten the nuts using 1/4 socket.
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Transducer Inspection
8-Test for no continuity between Body and terminals 1, 2, and 3. Connect an ohmmeter between
terminal 1 and body. There should be no continuity. Repeat test for terminal 2 and 3, using
body as ground. If continuity is present, replace transducer.
*See diagram

Reassembly
9- Install stator onto body. Connect wires to the three posts.
Stator should fit snugly into body. Note: Hand tighten the
nuts using 11/32 socket.
10- Install rotor into body. Grasp center shaft and carefully place rotor into body. Ensure center
shaft is fully engaged in main bearing. Looseness of rotor is
normal.
11- Assemble case to body. Line up shaft bearing and slide
case onto body.

12- Secure case to body. Insert bolts into body. Note: Handtighten the bolts first, then torque the bolts to 25 inch/lbs.
13- Attach fan and spacers to shaft. Slide on spacers and
then fan onto shaft. *See diagram
14- Attach pulley to shaft. Place pulley onto shaft. Install
lock washer and nut. *Hand tighten nut only (final
tightening torque is applied during installation on
engine).
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Work Card
Delco-Remy Model K5 Alternator Repair
Work Card #812F
Ea ch s tep mus t be i ni ti a l ed when compl ete.
Disasse mbly
1-Remove Pulley
2-Remove fan and two spacers*
3-Remove four case bolts*
4-Separate case from body
5-Remove rotor from body
6- Remove stator from body
7- Inspect Diode
Inspe ction
8-T est for no continuity between
body and terminals 1, 2, and 3*
Re asse mbly
9- Install stator onto body
10-Place rotor into body
11-Assemble case to body*
12-Secure case to body*[25 inch/lbs]
13-Attach fan and spacers to shaft
14-Attach pulley to shaft*
I______________certify this task as complete.

SUNCO AVIATION ™
Note: Steps 1-7 on the workcard participant‘s received contained initials by the previous shift.
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Airworthiness Directive

Airworthiness Directive
Effective Date 1-15-2011
AD-37748

Purpose
A manufacturer discrepancy has been filed with the Division of Airworthiness Standards office
regarding a change in repair procedures for the Vent Ace Model 100-F Airframe. This aircraft
utilizes two different alternator models: Delco-Remy Model 15-D and Delco-Remy Model K5.
This airworthiness directive applies to all alternators labeled ―Delco-Remy Model K5‖. If
encountered, all aircraft with a ―Delco-Remy Model K5‖ alternator installed shall be grounded
until the ―required action‖ is performed. Failing to comply with this directive will produce an
unairworthy condition and legal action will be taken.

Required action
The manufacturer (Delco-Remy) has changed the torque value for the four bolts that join the
case to the body of the alternator to 28 inch/lbs.

Required documentation
Notice of completion must be indicated on all workcards. Place the following information next
to the technicians initials for the installation step: ―AD-37748 Complied‖

U.S. Department of Transportation
Washington, DC

AD-37748
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Appendix D
Task Evaluation Sheet
Experimenter shall determine participants met the following conditions, after participant
completes the task and leaves the lab. An X indicates error has been made. All torque
values must be ± 1 inch/lbs

Position correct?
Check if the Center Nut, Lock Washer, and Pulley are positioned correctly.

Center Nut

Lock Washer

Pulley

Check if fan and spacer are positioned correctly.
Is the fan installed before the spacer?
Remove fan and spacer.

Position correct?

Check torque value of case bolts [28 inch/lbs]
Is each case bolt at correct torque value per airworthiness directive?
Remove case bolts.

4 Torque Values

fan
spacer

bolt 1

bolt 3

bolt 2

bolt 4

AD complied with?

Check if case and body are aligned correctly by locating alignment marks.
Do both marks match?
Remove case from body.
Remove rotor from body.

Case Aligned?

Check torque value at stator nuts [Hand tight]
Are stator nuts at correct torque value?
Remove stator.

3 torque values

Check position of diode (refer to figure below)
Is diode in correct position according to figure
below?

nut 1
nut 2

Diode position
correct?

Remove diode and place in the INCORRECT position for experiment reset.
Total Errors_______ Percent
Correct_______
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nut 3

Appendix E
Please answer the following questions honestly and accurately. Your responses will remain
completely anonymous.
All questions are answered with a 5-point scale.

1 - strongly disagree, 2 – disagree, 3 – unsure, 4 - agree, 5 - strongly agree
1. I had a good understanding of how to inspect and reassemble the alternator correctly.
2. The previous shift technician provided a clear picture of what work had been done to the
alternator.
3. All information required to complete the task was in the documentation.
4. I felt pressured to finish the alternator task quickly.
5. I fully understood each and every step of the task.
6. I am confident that the previous shift technician completed every step correctly.
7. I always look-over someone else's work before I sign-off on a task.
8. I had plenty of time to finish the alternator task.
9. I was aware the alternator had a "due back time" and I tried to finish the task quickly.
10. I was in a hurry to finish the alternator task.
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Appendix F
Scripts
Participant Briefing Script
Researcher:
1) Hello and welcome to the study. Please read this consent form carefully and sign and date it.
2) Please, fill out this demographics form.
3) Do you have any questions regarding the consent or demographics form?
4) Demonstrate the use of a clicker-type torque wrench to apply torque to a bolt.
5) Demonstrate the use of a digital multi-meter to find continuity.
6) Ask Participant the following questions:
Are you familiar with workcards?
A work card is an ordered number of steps, for instance 1-8, required to complete a task.
AMT's use work cards when performing maintenance on aircraft and components. You
follow the steps and initial each step as complete once you finish it. Each work card is
tailored to the specific task it is used for. AMT's are trained to follow procedures to
ensure a job is performed correctly.
Are you familiar with airworthiness directives?
Airworthiness directives (AD's) are legal documents, issued by the FAA, that require
immediate attention. AMT's are trained to comply with airworthiness directives. They
know that if they do not comply with AD's, the consequences could be severe.
Noncompliance affects not only for the integrity of the technician, but hundreds of lives
that fly in the aircraft.
7) Let me describe what will be happening today. You were just hired as an AMT at a major
aircraft repair facility. You work the evening shift and are just coming into your first day of
work. Today you will be asked to complete a maintenance task that a mechanic from the day
shift did not finish.
8) Randomly assign the participant to a condition.
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Written With Time Pressure Manager Script
Manager:
Say the following in a mild tempered voice.
1) Hi, welcome to work. Let's get started!
Walk participant over to workstation
2) I need you to finish up Jim‘s work with that alternator; he left already for the day.
3) He left all the tools out for you. Here‘s the paperwork.
Hand Participant “written documentation packet”
4) I need that alternator and workcard back in 20 minutes! Dispatch is already screaming at me!
5) I've gotta get back to my desk; gotta a lot of work to do.
6) Get it done quick and make sure it‘s done right!
Return to manager desk. DO NOT RESPOND TO PARTICIPANT QUESTIONS.
Start timer when you return to manger desk.
Monitor the timer and follow the notification schedule below:
At 5 minutes on the timer, Walk over to participant and say IN A FIRM VOICE
"Ya doing alright with that?"
At 10 minutes on the timer, walk over to participant and say IN A FIRM VOICE
"I need that alternator in 10 minutes"
At 15 minutes on the timer, walk over to participant and say IN A FIRM VOICE
"Ya got 5 minutes to finish that alternator!"
At 18 minutes on the timer, walk over to participant and say IN A FIRM VOICE
"Hurry up with that alternator, dispatch is losing it!"
Stop timer when participant returns the work card and alternator to the manager.
Record total time.
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Face-To-Face With Time Pressure Manager Script
Manager:
Say the following in a mild tempered voice.
1) Hi, welcome to work.
2) I need you to relieve Sam over there; her shift is ending soon.
3) She‘s got everything ya need.
Send participant to actor.
Return to manager desk. DO NOT RESPOND TO PARTICIPANT QUESTIONS.
Start timer when actor returns to manager desk.
Monitor the timer and follow the notification schedule below:
At 5 minutes on the timer, Walk over to participant and say IN A FIRM VOICE
"Ya doing alright with that?"
At 10 minutes on the timer, walk over to participant and say IN A FIRM VOICE
"I need that alternator in 10 minutes"
At 15 minutes on the timer, walk over to participant and say IN A FIRM VOICE
"Ya got 5 minutes to finish that alternator!"
At 18 minutes on the timer, walk over to participant and say IN A FIRM VOICE
"Hurry up with that alternator, dispatch is losing it!"
Stop timer when participant returns the work card and alternator to the manager.
Record total time.
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Written Manager Script
Manager:
Say the following in a mild tempered voice.
Hi, welcome to work.
I need you to finish up Jim‘s work with that alternator; he left already for the day.
He left all the tools out for you. Here‘s the paperwork.
Hand Participant “written documentation packet”

Face-To-Face Manager Script
Manager:
Say the following in a mild tempered voice.
Hi, welcome to work.
I need you to relieve Sam over there; her shift is ending soon.
She‘s got everything ya need.
Send participant to actor.
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Shift Change Actor‘s Script

Take your time explaining the steps. Look at participants body gestures for
understanding of each step. Give them time to look at you! (e.g., noding of
head, ect. ).

Hand participant the maintenace manuel. Point to each part
as you describe it.
1) "Hey, how‘s it going? I‘m Sam.‖
2) "This alternator is due for inspection, so I started working on it.‖
3) "Let me show you what I have done so far."

4) "Here is the workcard & maintenance manual pages I printed out. Follow along while I
describe each step I've done"
•
•

Give participant the maintenance manual pages & workcard.
Point to each part of alternator as you describe how you removed it.

5) "I began by removing the center nut and lock washer"
6) "Then I took the pulley off"
7) "Then I removed the fan"
8) "And next came the spacer"
9) "You got all that?"
• If yes, continue describing steps.
• If no, make sure participant understands what, how and why you did each step.
10) "Then I separated the case from the body, by removing the four case screws."
11) ―Here‘s the Airworthiness Directive for the case bolts.‖
Pont to Airworthiness Directive.
12) "The documentation does not say anything about the alignment marks, but they are very
important."
13) "I then pulled the rotor out of the body."
14) "Then, to get the stator out, I removed the 2 stator nuts holding it to the transducer"
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15) "Got all that?"
•

If yes, continue describing steps.

•

If no, make sure participant understands what, how and why you did each step.

16) "I removed the two screws holding down the diode, took it out, and tested it."
17) "I was finishing up step 7 when you walked in."
18) "It checked out just fine, so I reinstalled it.‖
19) ―To be honest, I went through this kinda quick. I‘m trying to get out of here.‖
19) "That‘s all I got for ya. Do you have any questions?"

IMPORTANT
This participant is NOT in the time pressure condition, say the following just before you
leave:

―When you‘re finished with the alternator, go and get the boss!‖
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Shift Turnover Actor‘s Time Pressure Script

Take your time explaining the steps. Look at participants body gestures for
understanding of each step. Give them time to look at you! (e.g., noding of
head, ect. ).

Hand participant the maintenace manuel. Point to each part
as you describe it.
1) "Hey, how‘s it going? I‘m Sam.‖
2) "This alternator is due for inspection, so I started working on it.‖
3) "Let me show you what I have done so far."

4) "Here is the workcard & maintenance manual pages I printed out. Follow along while I
describe each step I've done"
•
•

Give participant the maintenance manual pages & workcard.
Point to each part of alternator as you describe how you removed it.

5) "I began by removing the center nut and lock washer"
6) "Then I took the pulley off"
7) "Then I removed the fan"
8) "And next came the spacer"
9) "You got all that?"
• If yes, continue describing steps.
• If no, make sure participant understands what, how and why you did each step.
10) "Then I separated the case from the body, by removing the four case screws."
11) ―Here‘s the Airworthiness Directive for the case bolts.‖
Pont to Airworthiness Directive.
12) "The documentation does not say anything about the alignment marks, but they are very
important."
13) "I then pulled the rotor out of the body."
14) "Then, to get the stator out, I removed the 2 stator nuts holding it to the transducer"
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15) "Got all that?"
•

If yes, continue describing steps.

•

If no, make sure participant understands what, how and why you did each step.

16) "I removed the two screws holding down the diode, took it out, and tested it."
17) "I was finishing up step 7 when you walked in."
18) "It checked out just fine, so I reinstalled it.‖
19) ―To be honest, I went through this kinda quick. I‘m trying to get out of here.‖
19) "That‘s all I got for ya. Do you have any questions?"

IMPORTANT
This participant is in the time pressure condition, say the following just before you
leave:

―This is an AOG part and the aircraft is waiting to depart. The boss wants the alternator back
within the next 20 minutes.‖
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Appendix G
Debriefing Form
Thank you for participating in this study. This study is examining AMT's completing an
unfinished maintenance task that was left over from a previous shift. There is a prominent issue
regarding critical information transfer in aviation maintenance shift briefings. Your participation
will help determine how maintenance personnel may benefit from shift briefings.
We ask that you do not share your detailed experiences involved in this study with anyone for a
period of two months. This will increase confidentiality and prevent learning effects for future
participants in the study. Your performance and results in this study will remain anonymous.
All data gathered will remain under lock and key in the Human Factors Department. Results will
only be reported in group numbers (e.g. means, etc.).
You have the right to request a written copy of the results of this study for your personal records.
Results will be mailed to you, via email, after the finalization of this study.
Would you like a copy of the finalized results of this study emailed to you?
Yes or No
Email address
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